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1. Literature Review  
After the end of WTO financial services negotiations in 1997, only a minority of 
literatures made its assessment and analysis on the outcome of such negotiations. Dobson and 
Jacquet pointed out that although many countries had improved their offers over the course of 
the negotiations, it told little about the degree of market access thus achieved. “There is no single 
indicator of market access that could help to rank countries on a single scale according to 
existing barriers so that the corresponding contribution of the Financial Service Agreement in 
removing partly or totally some of these barriers could be judged.” They compared a part of 
commitments with the corresponding actual regulatory policies of financial sectors in 11 
countries, and concluded that only two countries were more open in their commitments than their 
actual policies, and eight countries remained unchanged. Thus they concluded "the actual 
liberalization in the banking sector does not seem to have happened." 1 
Cornford commented that the WTO financial services agreement enhanced the 
transparency of members’ current policy rather than promoting the market openness. The 
commitments, which were made by many countries, were more like confirmations of policies 
status quo, while some were even more backwards than the actual ones.2 
Mattoo analyzes the commitment of agreement made by all members, but he does not 
discuss the contribution of such commitments to market openness.3 Barth et al, for the first time, 
coordinated and quantified a large sample of the commitments and actual policy information 
with subjective criteria. On this basis, they compared the differences and figures out that the 
liberalization degree of commitments is lower than that of actual policies, particularly for 
developing countries.4 However, the paper didn’t further use those data analyzing the negotiation 
impact. 
Most existing literatures only pay attention to the clauses difference between negotiation 
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commitments and regulatory policies. However, commitments can bind the government policies 
helping to set the policy reputation. And policies themselves can not. So maybe it is not 
appropriate to assess the impact of commitments only based on their clauses difference from 
regulatory policies. This paper, based on the new available data of commitments and regulatory 
policies, quantitatively analyzed the negotiation effect. 
 
2. Model 
Based on the modeling methods of Claessens et al 5  and Yamori 6 , the following 
econometric model was set: 
 Yi=α+Piβ +C-t,iγ+εi   i=1, 2,…, N (1) 
where Y is the asset share of foreign banks in country i, used as the proxy variable of foreign 
banks’ expansion in developing countries; α is the constant; P is the policy variable vector, 
including regulatory practices and negotiation commitments of country i; β is the coefficient 
vector of policy variables; C is the vector of covariables, including banking variables, 
macroeconomic variables, institution variables et al; γ is the coefficient vector of covariables; ε is 
the random error; the subscript, i indicates different countries; the subscript -t indicates that the 
covariables are reversely lagged relative to dependent variable. I used the data of 2005 for 
dependent variable, but simple average from 2000 to 2004 for covariables. 
There is a potential omitted variable error for the estimation of equation (1) because some 
affecting factors may be unobservable and the data of some variables are unavailable. For such a 
reason, I modified equation (1) to equation (2), adding lagged dependent variable as an 
independent variable. I use the lagged dependent variable, Y-t, as the proxy of omitted variables 
to control the estimation errors. 
   Yi=α+Piβ +C-t,iγ+Y-t+εi   i=1, 2,…, N (2) 
I chose the covariables according to the conclusion from existing literatures. Market 
opportunity is the most popular explanation held by existing literatures. Claessens et al, Yamori, 
Goldberg & Johnson7, Brealey & Kaplanis8, all agree that the host country with high GDP or 
GDP per capita will attract more foreign banks. Focarelli & Pozzolo reported that high GDP per 
capita, low inflation and high stock market capitalization are associated with high probability of 
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foreign bank entry. 9  
According to the above, this paper uses the following covariables: GDP per capita, 
indicating national income level; the ratio of total banking assets over GDP and the rate of 
banking credit over GDP, indicating banking development level; stock market capitalization, 
indicating stock market development level.  
Banking efficiency and market structure are also important factors that existing literatures 
have paid attention to. Claessens et al reported that the host countries with the following local 
banking characteristics have more foreign banks: low ratio of overhead cost over total assets, low 
ratio of non-interest income over total assets, low tax rate. They do not find banking profit play 
an important role in attracting foreign banks. Focarelli & Pozzolo reported that among OECD 
countries, foreign banks tend to invest in host countries with low local banking efficiency, such 
as high overhead cost or low net interest income. Bonin & Abel reported that in Hungary, foreign 
banks have developed deposit and consuming credit market and local banks have to look for new 
market opportunities.10 Studying American banking market, Amel & Liang reported that the 
existing banks’ high profit, market scale and potential growth are important factors attracting 
foreign banks.11 
About market structure, the World Bank gave a review that there are two opposite 
theoretical viewpoint. One is high market concentration, generating strong monopoly power, 
which will waken competition and efficiency. Another is the increase of market concentration 
which will promote efficiency if there is scale economy. In developing countries, the banking 
market is usually highly concentrated and less competitive. So high market concentration may be 
harmful for banking efficiency and affect foreign banks entry in developing countries. 12  
Claessens et al concludes that market concentration is negatively associated with foreign bank 
entry. However, Focarelli & Pozzolo did not find the impact of host countries’ market 
concentration on probability of foreign bank entry. 
According to above, this paper employed the following covariables: the ratio of overhead 
cost over total assets and the ratio of net interest income over total assets, indicating banking 
efficiency; the top 3 banks’ asset share and interest rate spread, indicating degree of market 
competition. 
Institutional environment is also thought important for foreign bank entry. Grosse & 
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Goldberg13, Yamori took the country risk factor (Euromoney’s country risk indicator) into 
account, finding that foreign banks tend to invest in countries with stable economy. Focarelli & 
Pozzolo tested the impact of legal efficiency on foreign bank entry, but did not observe 
significant effect. This paper uses the legal scores from ICRG (International country risk guide) 
and governance indicators from WGI (worldwide governance indicator) as covariables to control 
the potential impact of institution environment.  
The following client strategy is a controversial issue. Clarke et al reported that foreign 
banks’ investment in U.S. and U.K. is associated with FDI of nonfinancial sectors.14 However, 
the foreign banks and foreign nonfinancial enterprises in a host country are not always from the 
same mother country, so their observation can not justify the following client hypothesis. For 
example, Seth et al (1998) found that in the U.S. market, foreign banks and a part of their clients 
are not from the same mother countries.15 Milller & Parkhe pointed out that the investment 
correlation between foreign banks and foreign nonfinancial enterprises can not be observed in 
developing host countries.16 So this paper did not take the following client strategy into account. 
 
3. Data 
The dependent and independent variables in equation (1) and (2) are listed in table 1. 
Because it would take some time for banks to change their investment strategies in 
foreign markets and there are only 2001 and 2005 data of dependent variable available after FSA 
enter into force in 1999, I used the 2005 data of asset share for model estimation. For covariables, 
I used the average of 2000 to 2004. I used a 42 countries sample for estimation, of which 67% 
countries made conservative commitments and 33% countries made radical commitments. 
Conservative commitments are more restrictive than actual regulatory policies and radical 
commitments are less restrictive than actual regulatory policies. The classification of 
commitments was according to index score of commitments and actual regulation from Barth et 
al (2006). 
                                                        
13 Grosse, R., Goldberg, L. “Foreign bank activity in the United States: an analysis by country of origin.” 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 1991, December: 1093-1112 
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agenda for further research.” World Bank Research Observer, 2003, 18 (1): 25. 
15 Seth, R., Nolle, D., et al. “Do banks follow their customers abroad?” Financial Markets, Institutions, 
and Instruments, 7(4), 1998:1-25. 
16 Milller, S., Parkhe, A. “Patterns in the expansion of U.S. bank’s foreign operations.” Journal of 
International Business Studies, 29(2), 1998: 359-390. 
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    Table 1 variable list 
name explanation resource 
Assetshr 
Assets of all foreign banks as a share of assets of 
all commercial banks 
Barth et al (2001 )17
Commt 
Standardized score of members’ commitments in 
FSA, varying from 0 to 1 with the limitation to 
banking service trade getting tightly. 
Barth et al ( 2006 )18  
 
 
Regula 
Standardized scores of members’ practiced 
supervision & regulation policies, ranging from 0 
to 1 with the limitation to banking getting tightly. 
Barth et al（2006 ) 
Concentration 
Assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of 
all commercial banks. 
Beck et al（2000 )19
Credit/GDP Private credit by commercial banks to GDP Beck et al ( 2000 ) 
Assets/GDP 
Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by 
commercial banks as a share of GDP 
Beck et al ( 2000 ) 
Stmktcap/GDP Value of listed shares to GDP World Bank20
 Ovc/assets 
Accounting value of all commercial banks’ 
overhead costs as a share of their total assets 
Beck et al (2000 ) 
Intmargin/assets 
Accounting value of all commercial banks’ net 
interest revenue as a share of total assets. 
Beck et al ( 2000 ) 
Taxrate Standardized scores of income tax rate from EFW Gwartney et al (2007 )21
GDP/cap GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) World Bank 
Inflation consumer prices (annual %) World Bank 
governance 
Standardized  scores of Worldwide Governance 
Indicator by World Bank, ranging from -2.5 (worst 
governance) to 2.5 (best governance) 
Kaufmann & Kraay22
Law 
scores of law & order index of International 
Country Risk Guide, ranging from 0 (Iak law & 
order) to 10 (strong law & order) 
Knack & Keefer23
                                                        
17 Barth, J., Caprio, G., et al. “The regulation and supervision of banks around the world - a new database, 
Volume 1.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, WPS2588,2001. 
18 Barth, J., Marchetti, J., et al. “Foregin banking: do countries’ WTO commitments match actual 
practices?” WTO staff working paper, ERSD-2006-11. 
19 Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., et al. “A new database on financial development and structure.” World 
Bank Economic Review 14, 597-605. 
20 World Bank. World Development Indicators Database. 
21 Gwartney, J., Lawson, R., et al. Economic freedom of the world: 2007 annual report. The Fraser 
Institute. 
22 Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., et al. “Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006.” World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4280 
23 Knack, S., Keefer, P. “Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative 
institutional measures.” Economics and Politics, 7: 207-227. 
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4. Basic estimation results 
4.1 Benchmark regression 
 Table 2 reported the benchmark regression results. Column 1 is the estimation of 
equation (1), column 2 is the estimation of equation (2) and column (3) is a variation of column 
(2), which added the interaction of regulation score (regula) and commitment score (comt) as 
independent variables. The effect of commitments is significant in column (2) but insignificant in 
column (1). The coefficients of some covariables in column (1) and (2) are also different. It 
seems that the omitted variable error in equation (1) is important, which is a major source of the 
difference between column (1) and (2). Further, in column (3), the jointly significance test of 
commitment score and the interaction term show the two variables’ coefficients jointly 
insignificant. And the goodness of fit of column (2) is better than that of column (3). So I prefer 
the estimation result in column (2), which is looked as the benchmark specification in this paper. 
Column (2) of table 2 presents clear effects of independent variables. Regulation (regula) 
and commitments (comt) are all significantly negatively correlated with foreign banks’ asset 
share, which means that, keeping regulatory policies unchanged, countries with more liberal 
commitments will be more attractive for foreign banks expanding asset share. 
GDP per capita is significantly correlated with foreign banks’ asset share, which is 
consistent with the conclusion of other literatures. Bank credit scale variable (credit/GDP) is 
significantly negatively correlated with foreign banks’ asset share, which is consistent with the 
conclusion of Miller & Parkhe, but different from the conclusion of Amel & Liang and Focarelli 
& Pozzolo. Their samples consisted of developed countries mainly, which may lead to different 
conclusion from this paper. Market concentration is significantly positively correlated with 
foreign banks’ asset share, showing that high market concentration is helpful for foreign banks’ 
expanding. A possible explanation is that high concentration is associated with low extent of 
competition, which leaves large market opportunities to efficient foreign banks. 
In fact, GDP per capita, bank credit scale and market concentration jointly indicates the 
market opportunities and potentialities in developing countries. High GDP per capita predicts 
large scale of demand. Low credit scale shows great market potentiality. High concentration 
indicates weak competition.  
From table 2, an initial conclusion can be drawn that the negotiation commitments do 
have impact which is independent on actual regulatory polices. More liberal commitments are 
associated with larger asset share of foreign banks. 
Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Fall 2008, Vol. 3, No. 3, p62-74 67
Does WTO financial negotiation promote foreign banks’ expansion in developing countries? 
  Table 2 Benchmark regression 
Dependent variable: assetshr2005, OLS estimation 
     (1)    (2) (3) 
Regula 
 
comt 
 
regula×comt 
 
GDP/cap 
 
inflation 
 
taxrate 
 
credit/GDP 
 
stmktcap/GDP 
 
concentration 
 
overhead/GDP 
 
law 
 
assetshr2001 
 
constant 
 
 
-.0942592** 
.0351712 
-.0546239 
.0527912 
 
 
.0000287* 
.0000156 
.0069763 
.0104475 
-.0667286 
.0505622 
-.0020552 
.0012899 
-.0967741 
.1436885 
.0047196** 
.002099 
-.0264271 
.0233169 
.0300452 
.0863921 
 
 
.3121024 
.1993817 
-.0758735** 
.0303924 
-.1037629** 
.0470187 
 
 
.000035** 
.0000134 
.0024289 
.0089881 
-.0232802 
.0447474 
-.00269*** 
.0011128 
-.1418387 
.1230187 
.0054217*** 
.0017983 
-.0268871 
.0198577 
.0534601 
.0738658 
-.0678162*** 
.0189978 
.3455269* 
.1700572 
-.0751465** 
.0310155 
-.1092414** 
.0525611 
.0080942 
.0323885 
.0000345** 
.0000138 
.0028736 
.0093037 
-.0181562 
.0498731 
-.002687** 
.0011307 
-.1454671 
.1258277 
.0054437*** 
.0018292 
-.0277559 
.0204728 
.0552685 
.0753959 
-.0677974*** 
.019302 
.3443174* 
.1728462 
Column 1：42 observations；F-test P= 0.001；Ad-R2= 0.4683；AIC=-1.30；B-P heteroskedasticity test P=0.56； 
Column 2：42 observations；F-test P= 0.000；Ad-R2= 0.6144；AIC=-14.17； B-P heteroskedasticity test P=0.85； 
Column 3：42 observations；F-test P= 0.000；Ad-R2= 0.6019；AIC=-12.26；B-P heteroskedasticity test P=0.85； 
Standard errors are listed in italics. ***, **, * = significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
 
4.2 Robustness test 
Table 2 shows that lagged dependent variable is important to control the omitted variable error. 
So I first checked whether the estimation results of benchmark specification depend on the data 
time of lagged dependent variable. I used the lagged dependent variable data in 1995 and the 
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average of lagged dependent variable data in 1995, 1996 and 200124 respectively substituting for 
the 2001 data. The result was reported in column (1) and (2) of table 3. The coefficients, signs, 
significant levels and numerical values of variable regulation (regula) and commitment (comt) 
changed a little, compared with column (2) of table 2. Other covariables’ coefficients also kept 
relatively stable. So the benchmark specification estimation results do not depend on the data 
time of lagged dependent variable. 
Because different proxy variables for the same factor may lead to different parameter 
estimation results, I substituted respectively banking asset scale (asset/GDP), general governance 
level (governance) and interest income (intmargin/as) for banking credit scale (credit/GDP), law 
& order level (law) and overhead cost (ovc/as). The results were reported in column (3) – (5), 
which presented that different proxy variables of financial development factor, institution factor 
and bank performance factor do not change the effects of regulation and commitments much. 
 
5. Empirical estimation of conservative commitments’ effect  
 So far, session 4 concluded that the commitments have generally significant impact on 
foreign banks market access in developing countries. However, most of the existing literatures 
agree that the negotiation achieved small successes  because of many countries making 
conservative commitments. So for further study, the commitment types should be differentiated. 
In the sample this paper used, one third of countries made radical commitments which are more 
liberal than existing regulatory policies, and other countries made conservative commitments 
which are less liberal than existing regulatory policies25. For added analysis I tested if the 
conservative commitments affect the benchmark specification’s estimation result.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
24 The available data are sufficient only in 1995, 1996 and 2001. 
25 The criteria of differentiation is the conclusion of Barth et al. 
Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Fall 2008, Vol. 3, No. 3, p62-74 69
Does WTO financial negotiation promote foreign banks’ expansion in developing countries? 
 
Table 3: Robustness test for benchmark regression 
Dependent variable: assetshr2005, OLS estimation 
 (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Substituting 
variables26: 
Assetshr9
5 
Assetshr95-01 Asset/GDP Governance Intmargin/as 
regula 
 
comt 
 
GDP/cap 
 
inflation  
 
taxrate 
 
credit/GDP 
 
stmktcap/GDP 
 
concentration   
 
ovc/as        
 
law        
 
assetshr2001 
 
cons 
 
substitutor 
 
-.0778** 
.0298 
-.0976** 
.0457 
.00004** 
.00001 
.0022 
.0088 
-.0034 
.0456 
-.0027** 
.0011 
-.139 
.1209 
.0059*** 
.0018 
-.0294 
.0196 
.0386 
.0724 
 
 
.3513** 
.167 
-.3055*** 
.0812 
-.071** 
.0294 
-.1039** 
.0449 
.00004** 
.00001 
.0021 
.0086 
-.0143 
 .0434 
-.0026** 
 .0011 
-.145 
.118 
.0056*** 
 .0017 
-.0268 
.0191 
.0506 
 .0709 
 
 
.3251* 
.163 
-.0729*** 
.0181 
-.09*** 
.0292 
-.0939** 
.0439 
.00004*** 
.00001 
.0026 
.0087 
-.0151 
.0434 
 
 
-.237** 
.096 
.0055*** 
.0017 
-.0367* 
.0201 
.0574 
.0714 
-.0715*** 
.0185 
.4348** 
.175 
-.0043*** 
.0015 
-.065** 
.027 
-.102** 
.043 
.00003** 
.00001 
.0046* 
.0026 
-.0031 
.0419 
-.0028*** 
.001 
-.113 
.11 
.0047*** 
.0016 
-.0283** 
.0138 
 
 
-.0642*** 
.0171 
.389** 
.156 
.1285** 
.056 
-.072** 
.03 
-.086* 
.0471 
.00003** 
.00001 
.0014 
.0093 
-.0243 
.045 
-.0024** 
.001 
-.156 
.123 
.0057*** 
.0018 
 
 
-.0189 
.017 
.057 
.076 
.306* 
.164 
-.064*** 
.019 
Column 1: 42 observations; F-test P= 0.000; Ad-R2= 0.5382; AIC=-6.60; B-P heteroskedasticity test P=0.34; 
Column 2: 42 observations; F-test P= 0.000; Ad-R2= 0.6437; AIC=-17.49; B-P heteroskedasticity test P=0.82; 
Column 3: 42 observations; F-test P= 0.000; Ad-R2= 0.6404;  AIC=-17.1; B-P heteroskedasticity test P=0.92; 
Column 4: 43 observations; F-test P= 0.000; Ad-R2= 0.6672; AIC=-22.06; B-P heteroskedasticity test P=0.99; 
Column 5: 42 observations; F-test P= 0.000; Ad-R2= 0.6068; AIC=-13.35; B-P heteroskedasticity test P=0.82; 
Standard errors are listed in italics. ***, **, * = significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
                                                        
26 Substituting variables’ parameters estimation is listed in the last row of upper part of table 3. 
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 To do so, I set a conservative commitment dummy variable, cnsv, which equals to one if 
a country made conservative commitments and equals to zero if a country made radical 
commitments. I added the both interaction term between cnsv and regula (cnsv×regula), and 
between cnsv and comt (cnsv×comt) to the benchmark specification, reporting the estimation 
results in column (1) of table 4. The coefficients of regula and comt show that countries, making 
radical commitments, have significant commitment impact. In order to find if countries with 
conservative commitments also have significant commitment impact, I deducted 1 from the 
numerical value of cnsv in the two above interaction terms, making two new ones, 
(cnsv-1)×regula and (cnsv-1)×comt. The two new interaction terms were substituted for the old 
and the estimation results were listed in column (2) of table 4. The coefficients of regula and 
comt in column (2), representing the commitment effects of countries making conservative 
commitments, are insignificant respectively. But the joint-significant F test (P=0.03) rejects the 
hypothesis that the two coefficients are both zero. So, it seems that the co-linearity between 
regula, comt and interaction terms bias the estimation. To avoid the bias, I made two more 
specifications, putting only one interaction term into regression each time. The two estimation 
results are reported in column (3) and (4). Compared with column (2), column (3) eliminated 
(cnsv-1)×regula. The coefficient of comt in column (3) shows that the commitment effect is 
insignificant in countries making conservative commitments. Compared with column (2), 
column (4) eliminated (cnsv-1)×comt. The coefficient of regula in column (4) shows that the 
regulation effect is insignificant in countries making conservative commitments. It’s helpful to 
identify the commitments effect in countries making conservative commitments if the better one 
of both column (3) and (4) can be justified. Unfortunately, based on Davidson-Mackinnon test 
and fit-of-goodness test, it is hard to tell which one is better. So, the analysis of table 4 shows 
that countries making conservative commitments present weak commitment effect.  
 In order to check the robustness of estimation results in table 4, I substituted 
Assetshr95-01, the average value of lagged dependant variable in 1995, 1996 and 2001, for 
Assetshr2001. The estimation results are reported in table 5. Generally, the parameters in table 
4 are similar with those in table 5. But for table 5, 
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    Table 4: Estimation of conservative commitments effect  
              Dependent variable: assetshr2005, OLS estimation 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Regula 
 
Comt 
 
cnsv×regula 
 
cnsv×comt 
 
(cnsv-1)×regula 
 
(cnsv-1)×comt 
 
GDP/cap 
 
inflation 
 
taxrate 
 
credit/GDP 
 
stmktcap/GDP 
 
concentration 
 
overhead/GDP 
 
law 
 
assetshr2001 
 
constant 
 
-.154*** 
.044 
-.244*** 
.079 
.096 
.067 
.163 
.098 
 
 
 
 
.00004*** 
.00001 
.0025 
.0084 
.04 
.049 
-.0022** 
.001 
-.264** 
.124 
.0056*** 
.0017 
-.026 
.018 
.049 
.069 
-.073*** 
.018 
.295* 
.159 
-.058 
.048 
-.081 
.058 
 
 
 
 
.096 
.067 
.163 
.099 
.00004*** 
.00001 
.0025 
.0084 
.04 
.049 
-.0022** 
.001 
-.264** 
.124 
.0056*** 
.0017 
-.026 
.018 
.049 
.069 
-.073*** 
.018 
.295* 
.159 
-.11*** 
.033 
-.042 
.052 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.209** 
.095 
.00004*** 
.00001 
.001 
.008 
.033 
.049 
-.0022** 
.001 
-.21* 
.12 
.005*** 
.0017 
-.027 
.019 
.035 
.07 
-.074*** 
.018 
.322** 
.16 
-.015 
.042 
-.139*** 
.048 
 
 
 
 
.132** 
.065 
 
 
.00004*** 
.00001 
.004 
.0086 
.0035 
.045 
-.0025** 
.001 
-.237* 
.126 
.0061*** 
.002 
-.026 
.019 
.067 
.07 
-.068*** 
.018 
.302* 
.163 
Column 1：42 observations；F-test P= 0.001；Ad-R2= 0.6706；AIC=-19.68；B-P heteroskedasticity  test P=0.19；
jointly significant F test of two interaction terms, P=0.042 
Column 2：42 observations；F-test P= 0.001；Ad-R2= 0.6706；AIC=-19.68； B-P heteroskedasticity test P=0.19；J
significant F test of comt and regula, P=0.03; Jointly significant F test of two 
interaction terms, P=0.042 
Column 3：42 observations；F-test P= 0.001；Ad-R2= 0.6586；AIC=-18.71；B-P heteroskedasticity test P=0.51； 
Column 4：42 observations；F-test P= 0.001；Ad-R2= 0.6508；AIC=-17.76；B-P heteroskedasticity test P=0.26； 
Standard errors are listed in italics. ***, **, * = significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.  
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Davidson-MacKinnon test rejects the specification of column (4) at 10% level, so specification in column (3) 
is better. The results support that commitment effect are weak in countries making conservative commitments.  
 
Table 5: Robustness test of conservative commitments effect  
Dependent variable: assetshr2005, OLS estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Regula 
 
Comt 
 
cnsv×regula 
 
cnsv×comt 
 
(cnsv-1)×regula 
 
(cnsv-1)×comt 
 
GDP/cap 
 
inflation 
 
taxrate 
 
credit/GDP 
 
stmktcap/GDP 
 
concentration 
 
overhead/GDP 
 
law 
 
assetshr95-01 
 
Cont. 
 
-.143*** 
.043 
-.24*** 
.075 
.0845 
.0646 
.163* 
.095 
 
 
 
 
.000037*** 
.000012 
.0022 
.008 
.046 
.047 
-.002** 
.001 
-.258** 
.119 
.0057*** 
.002 
-.026 
.018 
.044 
.067 
-.077*** 
.017 
.277* 
.153 
-.059 
.047 
-.077 
.056 
 
 
 
 
.0845 
.065 
.163* 
.095 
.000037*** 
.000012 
.0022269 
.008 
.046 
.047 
-.002** 
.001 
-.258** 
.119 
.0057*** 
.002 
-.026 
.018 
.044 
.067 
-.077*** 
.017 
.277* 
.153 
-.11*** 
.033 
-.042 
.052 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.209** 
.095 
.000035*** 
.000013 
.001 
.008 
.033 
.049 
-.0022** 
.001 
-.21* 
.12 
.005*** 
.0017 
-.027 
.0187 
.035 
.07 
-.074*** 
.018 
.32* 
.16 
-.015 
.04 
-.135*** 
.046 
 
 
 
 
.121* 
.063 
 
 
.000037*** 
.000012 
.0038 
.008 
.0093 
.043 
-.0024** 
.001 
-.23* 
.12 
.0062*** 
.0017 
-.026 
.0183 
.063 
.068 
-.072*** 
.017 
.28* 
.16 
Column 1: 42 observations; F-test P=0.000; Ad-R2=0.6941; AIC=-22.79; B-P heteroskedasticity test P=0.198; jointly 
significant F test of two interaction terms, P=0.045 
column 2: 42 observations; F-test P=0.000; Ad-R2=0.6941; AIC=-16.05; B-P heteroskedasticity test P=0.71; Jointly 
significant F test of comt and regula, P=0.045 
column 3: 42 observations; F-test P=0.000; Ad-R2=0.6586; AIC=-18.71; B-P heteroskedasticity test P=0.51;  
Column 4: 42 observations; F-test P=0.001; Ad-R2=0.6734; AIC=-20.57; B-P heteroskedasticity test P=0.26;  
Standard errors are listed in italics. ***, **, * = significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
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6. Conclusion 
Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that the negotiation commitments has 
significant impact on foreign banks expansion in developing countries. The more liberal the 
commitments are, the bigger market share the foreign banks have. Such effect does not depend 
on regulatory policies. And if the commitments are more liberal than regulatory policies, the 
effect is particularly strong. If the commitments are less liberal than regulatory policies, the 
effect is not significant again.  
Most developing countries made conservative commitments in the financial negotiation of 
WTO. So the effect that conservative commitments did not promote foreign banks expansion 
possibly is what the most developing countries went after, and they did realize that aim. 
